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Abstract 
Entrepreneurs play a vital role in economic development as key contributors to technological innovation and new 
job growth. Further, entrepreneurs help build communities in ways such as providing jobs, conducting business 
locally, creating and participating in entrepreneurial networks, investing in community projects, and giving to 
local charities. Realizing both the economic and social impact of entrepreneurship, many states and local 
communities have implemented aggressive strategies aimed at cultivating and nurturing entrepreneurs. 
Schumpeter’s canonical depiction of the entrepreneur as an agent of social and economic change implies that 
entrepreneurs are especially sensitive to the social environment.  We extract teachings from several disciplines 
while adopting a primary perspective based on institutional economics to consider the social dimensions of 
entrepreneurship.  The level and modes of entrepreneurial activity are affected by the surrounding culture and by 
legal rules.  Entrepreneurs may partially overcome institutional deficiencies by relying on social networks that 
facilitate reputational bonding as a means for resource-sharing. 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, social institutions, culture, law, social networks, reputation. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The capacity and willingness to develop, organize and manage a business venture along with any of its risks in 
order to make a profit. The most obvious example of entrepreneurship is the starting of new businesses. In 
economics, entrepreneurship combined with land, labor, natural resources and capital can produce profit. 
Entrepreneurial spirit is characterized by innovation and risk-taking, and is an essential part of a nation's ability 
to succeed in an ever changing and increasingly competitive global marketplace. 
In a pioneering book chapter whose title foreshadowed the present chapter’s theme, Shapero and Sokol 
(1982: 83) averred that ‘[t]he social and cultural factors that enter into the formation of entrepreneurial events are 
most felt through the formation of individual value systems.  More specifically, in a social system that places a 
high value on the formation of new ventures, more individuals will choose that path ….  More diffusely, a social 
system that places a high value on innovation, risk-taking, and independence is more likely to produce 
entrepreneurial events than a system with contrasting values.’ Subsequent research reviewed in this chapter has 
largely vindicated Shapero and Sokol’s proposition, although the interrelations between entrepreneurship and 
various social dimensions now seem more complex. 
 
THE ENTREPRENEUR: AN INDIVIDUAL PORTRAIT 
Some seventy years ago, Schumpeter (1934: 93-94), the patron saint of all entrepreneurs (Solow 1994), depicted 
the motives of the entrepreneur as follows: 
First of all there is the dream and the will to found a private kingdom, usually, though not necessarily, 
also a dynasty.  … Then there is the will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others, to 
succeed for the sake, not of the fruits of success, but of success itself.  From this aspect, economic action 
becomes akin to sport… The financial result is a secondary consideration, or, at all events, mainly valued as an 
index of success and as a symptom of victory, the displaying of which very often is more important as a motive 
of large expenditure than the wish for the consumers’ goods themselves.  … Finally, there is the joy of creating, 
of getting things done, or simply of exercising one’s energy and ingenuity.  ...  Our type seeks out difficulties, 
changes in order to change, delights in ventures. 
Romantic as it may seem at first glance, Schumpeter’s portrait of entrepreneurial motives captures 
essential facets of entrepreneurship that mainstream economics still grapples with.  Schumpeter’s core 
contention, that entrepreneurs do not seek greater wealth for the sake of increasing consumption seems at odds 
with conventional depictions of economic agents.  This seeming contradiction is all the more evident when one 
considers the alleged motives of ‘the joy of creating… delights in venturing’, which, one should bear in mind, 
are related to economic activity in the market, not recreation and leisure.   
Recent evidence suggests, however, that Schumpeter might be right.  Hamilton (2000) finds that in the 
United States, median entrepreneurs earnings after 10 years in business are 35 percent less than the predicted 
alternative wage on a paid job of the same duration.  Hamilton’s use of a self-selection model shows that it is not 
the case that low-ability workers become entrepreneurs; if anything, the evidence shows that higher-ability 
workers are more likely to enter into self-employment.  Therefore, large-sample evidence amassed by Hamilton 
Journal of Culture, Society and Development                                                                                                                                   www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2422-8400    An International Peer-reviewed Journal 
Vol.22, 2016 
 
16 
strongly suggests that self-employment offers substantial nonpecuniary benefits, such as ‘being your own boss.’ 
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) similarly find that entrepreneurs are willing to concentrate their 
investments in their own businesses despite the fact that they present a far worse risk-return tradeoff than 
investing in public equity.  Kerins, J. Smith and R. Smith (2004), moreover, provide evidence on the very high 
cost-of-capital levels that entrepreneurs and venture capitalists are willing to bear to engage in entrepreneurial 
activity.  The leading explanation for these results is based on nonpecuniary benefits from entrepreneurial 
activity.  A further sociologically-based explanation is that high-ability individuals are culturally encouraged to 
start firms where family members can be employed and share directly in the profits.  Further work is needed to 
test this hypothesis.  Using Swedish data, Giannetti and Simonov (2003) do argue that social norms may drive 
people into entrepreneurship notwithstanding lower individual profits. 
Amit et al. (2001) compared Canadian entrepreneurs with senior managers who decided not to start 
ventures in the high-technology sector.  They found that for entrepreneurs' decision to start a new venture wealth 
attainment was significantly less important relative to an aggregate of ten other decision dimensions (specifically: 
vision, stability, power, lifestyle, leadership, innovation, independence, ego, contribution, and challenge).  
Several other studies maintain that entrepreneurs are more over-confident than regular people are and appear to 
be driven by wishful thinking (Bernardo and Welch 1998; Arabsheibani, de Meza, Maloney, and Pearson 2000; 
Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg 1988).  However, one would be wrong to interpret either Schumpeter or the 
evidence mentioned above as suggesting that entrepreneurs are agnostic or oblivious to financial considerations.  
Studies conducted in several countries show that individuals are sensitive to capital constraints in their decision 
to take entrepreneurial positions – in particular, self-employment.1 
Several studies hold that entrepreneurs find special importance in their independence (Blanchflower and 
Oswald 1998; Blanchflower 2000; Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer 2001; Hundley 2001).  Using survey data 
from the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland, Benz and Frey (2004) argue that the greater independence 
and autonomy of self-employed persons is largely responsible for their particular job satisfaction.  A series of 
recent studies on OECD-member nations further shows that people most often move into self-employment when 
they are dissatisfied with their life, and that the very act of creating their own business tends to make them more 
satisfied than the average person in their country (Hofstede 1998; Noorderhaven et al. 1999; Noorderhaven et al. 
2003; Hofstede et al. 2004).  Falter (2002) holds that the greater job satisfaction exhibited by the self-employed 
in Switzerland stems rather from their job characteristics than from income.  Falter notes that this may be due to 
individual over-optimism in addition to greater freedom. 
Taken together, the above evidence suggests that entrepreneurs are relatively more willing to forgo 
income and to bear costs, including through increased risk levels, in order to engage in independent ventures.  
These studies may have some methodological weaknesses, however.  To be able to confirm that entrepreneurs 
have alternative options with higher income, one would need to replicate the exercise in Stern (2004), who 
collected data on scientists who give up more lucrative job offers to do real science at lower pay.  Still, while the 
literature’s lack of measurement on alternative options is a weak point, the preponderance of survey evidence 
from the entrepreneurship literature does still at least suggest that entrepreneurs often had more lucrative 
alternatives inside established firms (see Amit et al. 2001).   
Compared with non-entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs behave as if they understand the present fairly well 
but have rather special views regarding the future.  Yet the image of the entrepreneur reflected in these works is 
still very fragmented.  A richer picture emerges when one considers insights from a psychological perspective.  
While the literature on entrepreneurship and individual-level psychology is voluminous and lies beyond the 
present scope,2 here we briefly note that entrepreneurs’ risk propensity has been found to be non-distinguishable 
from that of non-entrepreneurs.  Rather, entrepreneurs differ in their risk (under-)assessment, consistent with 
their general over-optimism (e.g., Palich and Babgy 1995; Sarasvathy, Simon and Lave 1998). 
Researchers have developed a multi-dimensional construct of entrepreneurial orientation with three sub-
dimensions: innovation, proactiveness, and risk-taking, and established its validity in several national samples 
(Miller 1983; Covin and Slevin 1989; 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Kreiser, Marino and Weaver 2002).  These 
dimensions capture more elements of entrepreneurial motivations and behavior than other models do, thus 
bringing us closer to the model suggested by Schumpeter and other classic scholars (Knight 1921; Kirzner 1973).  
Importantly, these constructs lend themselves to examining the impact of national culture on entrepreneurship 
(Kreiser, Marino and Weaver 2002).   
A notable feature of this branch of entrepreneurship literature, however, is the paucity of studies on the 
role of personal values in differentiating entrepreneurs from salary earners.  Values are conceptions of the 
                                                          
1 See Evans and Jovanovic (1989); Evans and Leighton (1989); Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994); Van Praag and Van Ophem (1995); 
Lindh and Ohlsson (1996); Blanchflower and Oswald (1998); Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Van Praag (2003). 
2 For a review see Rauch and Frese (2000). Wadeson (this volume) reviews the cognitive aspects of entrepreneurship 
concerning decision-making and attitudes to risk. 
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desirable – a motivational construct.  They represent broad goals that apply across contexts and time (Rokeach 
1973; Schwartz 1997; Schwartz and Bilsky 1987, 1990).  Personal value emphases have been systematically 
related to individuals’ behavior (e.g., Schwartz and Bardi 2003).  Drawing on Rokeach’s (1973) theory of values, 
Bird (1989) and Sarasvathy (2001) proposed that entrepreneurs’ personal value emphases may distinguish them 
from other people.  Having searched the business, economics, and finance sections of the JSTOR database and 
internet resources more limitedly, we are not aware of studies that tested this proposition empirically.   
The Schwartz (1992) model of individual values defines ten broad values according to the motivation 
that underlies each of them (specifically: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, 
universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition, and security).  These values are presumed to encompass the 
range of motivationally distinct values recognized across cultures.  These values can further be organized along 
two bipolar dimensions: self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and conservation versus openness to change.  
This model appears to hold promise for a more systematic analysis of entrepreneurial orientations.  The Schwartz 
(1992) model can be used to investigate reliably whether entrepreneurs indeed possess a distinct set of 
motivational preferences relative to their non-entrepreneur peers, as Schumpeter conjectured.  We note, without 
elaboration, that a plausible hypothesis in this respect would be that entrepreneurs’ value priorities will 
emphasize self-enhancement and openness to change over self-transcendence and conservation, respectively. 
 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The richness of entrepreneurial motivations suggests quite clearly that entrepreneurial behavior responds to an 
equally rich set of cues from the social environment.  Indeed, because entrepreneurial activity is especially 
sensitive to non-pecuniary incentives one may assume that entrepreneurship will be associated with distinct 
social dimensions—more than, say, faceless spot market transactions in commodities.  Entrepreneurs—like all 
economic agents for that matter—operate in concrete social institutional settings, namely, against written and 
unwritten ‘rules of the game’: laws, norms, beliefs, etc. (North 1990).  Among other things, these social 
institutions affect the perceptions of desirability and feasibility of entrepreneurial events postulated by Shapero 
and Sokol (1982).  These institutions also affect monetary and non-monetary transaction costs for entrepreneurial 
activity (cf. Hayton, George and Zahra 2002).   
Research on the social dimensions of entrepreneurship has made considerable progress since Shapero 
and Sokol (1982).  While these scholars drew primarily on research in sociology and anthropology (focusing 
especially on minority and immigrant communities 1 ), current research employs a variety of disciplinary 
approaches.  The predominant analytical framework, however, is Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) theory and dataset on 
cultural value dimensions (Hayton, George and Zahra 2002).  In addition, other, less capacious, institutions also 
play a pivotal role in entrepreneurial activity.  To organize the discussion, we adopt an institutional economics 
approach drawing on Williamson’s (2000) framework for institutional analysis. 
Williamson’s model distinguishes four levels of analysis.  ‘Level 1’ consists of informal institutions.  
This is where norms, customs, mores, and traditions are located and where religion plays a role.  More generally, 
this is the level of culture.  Level 2 consists of formal legal rules and regulations, comprising constitutions, law, 
property rights, etc.  Governance structures and marginal analysis belong to Levels 3 and 4, respectively.  The 
core assumption underlying this model is that in the long run, elements located in adjacent levels should be 
compatible with one another and likewise for specific institutions within each level.  The following sections 
demonstrate how specific aspects of entrepreneurship relate to social institutions at various levels. 
 
CULTURE AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
It is now virtually undisputed in the entrepreneurship literature that culture bears a profound impact on all facets 
of entrepreneurship in societies (George and Zahra 2002).  This scholastic consensus is consistent with the 
general importance accorded to culture in management studies but is not necessarily shared by some branches in 
economics.  Hayton, George and Zahra (2002) provide a comprehensive review of empirical studies that have 
examined the association between national culture and entrepreneurship.  A careful reading of these studies 
reveals, however, that this literature has some conceptual and methodological obstacles still to overcome.  
Instead of recounting Hayton, George and Zahra’s (2002) review we concentrate on these basic issues and 
supplement this analysis with more recent evidence. 
What is culture? Defined in subjective terms, culture refers to the complex of meanings, symbols, and 
assumptions about what is good or bad, legitimate or illegitimate that underlies the prevailing practices and 
norms in a society (Bourdieu 1972; Markus and Kitayama 1994).  Often, culture is defined a set of shared values 
and beliefs (Hofstede 1980; 2001).  A common postulate in cross-cultural psychology is that all societies 
confront similar basic issues or problems when they come to regulate human activity (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 
                                                          
1 This chapter concentrates on country- or nation-level societies. Entrepreneurship among subcultures such as immigrants and 
minority groups is discussed in Basu (this volume). 
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1961).  A society's culture reflects its response to these issues in certain cultural orientations.  Such cultural 
orientations represent general societal stances that are deeply ingrained in the functioning of major societal 
institutions, in widespread practices, in symbols and traditions, and, through adaptation and socialization, in the 
values of individuals (Kluckhohn 1951; Hofstede 1980; Schwartz 1999).  Cultural orientations are also 
associated with certain (personal) cognitive styles, leading scholars to consider cultures as ‘systems of thought’ 
(Nisbett et al. 2001; Peng, Ames and Knowles 2001). 
A basic yet crucial point for understanding the social dimensions of entrepreneurship is that culture is a 
society-level phenomenon.  The so-called ‘ecological fallacy’ occurs when one fails to acknowledge the 
distinction between the individual and society levels of analysis (Hofstede 1980; 2001).  To see the level-of-
analysis distinction in the present context, consider two iconic scholars: Weber (1904) and Schumpeter (1934).  
Weber's theory on the Protestant ethic related economic development to certain societal orientations, which 
Weber associated with Calvinism and Puritanism in particular.  Among other things, these ethics emphasized the 
role of the individual in this world as a free soul seeking material wealth as evidence for being one of the chosen.  
Although Weber is often associated with entrepreneurship (e.g., Thomas and Mueller 2000), his theory was not 
explicitly directed toward entrepreneurship (Brouwer 2002).  Crucially, Weber was interested in societal values, 
not in the individual entrepreneur's motivations.  In contrast, Schumpeter’s theory of entrepreneurial motivations, 
cited above, was entirely about individual motivations and did not postulate a societal ethic.  Hence, Schumpeter 
(1934) cannot be considered ‘a refutation of Weber's theory’ (cf. Brouwer 2002, p. 85) because the two theories 
apply to different levels of analysis.   
Studies avoiding the ecological fallacy have examined the proposition that certain individual features 
consistent with Schumpeterian-like entrepreneurship may be more common in certain national cultures.  This is a 
plausible proposition, which essentially seeks to find traces of cultural orientations in personal traits.  Without 
exception, researchers used Hofstede's four cultural value dimensions of individualism/collectivism, power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity.1  Thus, Meuller and Thomas (2000) show that 
innovativeness and internal locus of control were more likely to be found among students coming from cultures 
high in individualism and low in uncertainty avoidance (see also Thomas and Mueller 2000).    
These studies and earlier ones in a similar spirit (e.g., Shane (1994, 1995)) suggest that a particular 
cultural profile—in particular, high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance, which is characteristic of 
English-speaking countries and especially the United States—is especially conducive to entrepreneurship.  
Evidence mentioned below on legal institutions is consistent with this view.  At present, however, it may be too 
early to reach such a conclusion.  As a broad generalization, researchers tended to examine individual-level 
constructs and employed instruments that were developed in the United States (Kreiser, Marino and Weaver 
2002).  More work is needed to establish these elements' universality, as has been done with the Schwartz (1992) 
model of personal values or the ‘Big Five’ personality attributes (see Ciavarella et al. 2004; on cognition see 
Mitchell et al. 2000).   
In the meanwhile, one cannot dismiss the notion that current studies may miss the value-creation 
function of certain personal traits not highlighted in the Schumpeterian template.  Entrepreneurship a la 
Schumpeter and Kirzner involves motivation, cognition, and action, with possible mediators like intention 
(Krueger, Reilly and Carsrud 2000).  The entrepreneur acts on what she perceives as a valuable opportunity, 
motivated by her special motivations.  The Schumpeterian entrepreneur is usually portrayed as a quintessential 
model of Western agency: an autonomous individual striving against the mainstream to take advantage of his or 
her uniqueness.2  Perhaps non-Western cultures encourage value-creation and innovation through other more 
collectivistic values.  
A growing literature now holds that the Western notion of individual agency may not similarly apply in 
other cultures.  Cultures known to value embeddedness over autonomy (or collectivism over individualism) have 
been found to be populated by individuals with a greater distaste for uniqueness and autonomous action (Menon 
et al. 1999; Markus and Kitayama 2003; Miller 2003).  Furthermore, differences in how individuals frame and 
interpret events between Western and East Asian cultures (mostly U.S. versus China and Korea) have been 
linked to differences in the individualism/collectivism cultural dimension.  While Westerners may attend more to 
specific items and persons, recent studies in this literature suggest that East Asians attend more to the field and 
the general context (Nisbett et al. 2001; Peng, Ames and Knowles 2001).  Causal explanations relying on 
cultural differences are, without doubt, highly provocative, and more work is needed to verify their robustness 
(see Begley and Tan 2001; Morse et al. 1999; Mitchell et al. 2000).  Needless to say, not all entrepreneurs from 
                                                          
1 Hofstede's theory and the usefulness of his dataset, especially for contemporary empirical studies, have been criticized on 
various grounds, which we cannot address in the present scope. In our view, the Hofstede framework largely withstands the 
criticisms leveled against it. 
2 “Agency” here means “being agentic” as used in psychology. It should not connote the “agency problem” known in 
economics. 
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different cultures would exhibit these differences to the same degree.  For example, many entrepreneurs from 
starkly different cultures would rank equally high in terms of their individual preference for autonomous action, 
and yet it is still possible that culture would lead to significant differences between entrepreneurial norms of 
behavior at the mean on these various cognitive dimensions. 
Another line of research considers relations between cultural value dimensions and other individual-
level factors related to entrepreneurship.  According to Hofstede, low uncertainty avoidance ‘implies a greater 
willingness to enter into unknown ventures’ (2001, p. 164).  Hayton, George and Zahra (2002) maintain that high 
individualism, high masculinity, low uncertainty avoidance, and low power distance are conducive to 
entrepreneurship.  Nevertheless, the evidence is mixed.  Using patent filings as a proxy for entrepreneurship, 
Shane (1993) finds support for most of the correlations hypothesized above.  Morris, Avilla and Allen (1993), 
however, argue for a curvilinear relation between individualism/collectivism and corporate entrepreneurship.  
Studies find that business ownership correlates positively with uncertainty avoidance and with power distance, 
but not with individualism.  In support of Hofstede et al.’s (2004) theory, these empirical findings underline the 
idea that a climate of high uncertainty avoidance in large organizations pushes enterprising individuals to go out 
and create their own businesses (Wennekers et al. 2002; Noorderhaven et al. 2002; Noorderhaven et al. 2003).   
Brief mention should be made of two studies that employ a materialism/post-materialism value 
dimension derived from Inglehart (1997).  Using Inglehart's four-item post-materialism index, Uhlaner and 
Thurik (2004) document a negative correlation between total entrepreneurial activity and the level of post-
materialism, i.e., higher average preference for greater ‘voice’ to people versus social order and economic 
stability.  Hunt and Levie (2003), however, find that entrepreneurial activity exhibits weak and not always 
consistent correlations with cultural variables from Hofstede and Inglehart, and that these correlations pale in 
comparison with a strong positive link with population growth. 
Thus, the literature is currently in a state of flux.  The studies mentioned above are premised on the 
assumption of conceptual compatibility among social institutions that also underlies the institutional economics 
approach (North 1990; Williamson 2000).  This premise, however, does not imply that only a unique cultural 
profile can support entrepreneurship, particularly when broad proxies like self-employment and business 
ownership serve to gauge it.  Culture is the set of societal responses to general issues societies face.  It is not 
impossible to assume that different cultures could achieve roughly equivalent levels of entrepreneurship, vaguely 
defined.  Ulijn and Weggeman (2001) indeed argue to that effect with regard to Hofstede's model.   
Yet there is a more disconcerting alternative to this ‘cultural-relativism’ hypothesis.  In this view, the 
variable for entrepreneurship used by many studies—namely, self-employment and/or ownership of a small 
business—could be misleading.  At the individual level of analysis, the more entrepreneurial individuals in any 
society indeed routinely start their own ventures on a small scale.  However, at the societal level of analysis, 
some cultural environments may be more conducive to firm growth.  Consequently, these societies will come to 
be populated by a distribution of enterprises that includes many large firms (cf. Desai et al. 2003).  This is 
consistent with the fact that in developing countries—which tend to rank higher on collectivism, power distance, 
and (less systematically) uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede 2001)—the firm size distribution is heavily populated 
by very small firms (Tybout 2000; Cabral and Mata 2003). 
Culture may exert its effect on levels and formats of entrepreneurial activity through numerous 
mediating channels.  Above we considered the potential effect of culture on some personal traits relevant to 
entrepreneurship; below we will look at culture and widespread social norms or the law.  The latter institutions 
are located either at the same level or at adjacent levels in Williamson's (2000) model.  One is more likely to 
observe systematic relations with culture in these levels than between culture and higher-level phenomena, 
including specific facets of entrepreneurship, because mediating and/or additional (non-cultural) factors may 
obscure the link to the cultural environment – obscure, but not eradicate. 
Beyond data availability limitations, the continuing use of Hofstede's data set, notwithstanding the fact 
that it originates in the late 1960s, reflects a broad consensus in the literature that culture is relatively stable.  The 
main concern relates to the interaction between culture and economic development.  Hofstede (2001) indeed 
argues that greater development increases individualism, and Inglehart's (1997) theory is predicated on economic 
progress.  Nevertheless, the little evidence regarding historical trends in national culture suggests that absent 
severe external shocks cultural change is very slow (Schwartz, Bardi, and Bianchi 2000; Inglehart and Baker 
2000).  Among the factors contributing to this effect is the fact that cultural value priorities are imparted to 
individuals at very young ages (Goodnow 1997).   
The entrepreneurship literature is largely consistent with this view, although little direct attention has 
been paid thus far to potential effects on entrepreneurship of such dynamic processes.  McGrath et al. (1992) 
surveyed entrepreneurs from the United States, mainland China, and Taiwan with items related to Hofstede's 
dimensions.  These researchers conclude that on the individualism/collectivism dimension, ‘fifty years of 
exposure to very different ideologies have done little to break down the traditional collectivist Chinese culture’ 
among the Chinese and the Taiwanese.  McGrath et al. do find evidence suggesting value change on the power 
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distance and uncertainty avoidance dimensions.  Schmitt-Rodermund and Vondracek (2002) and Schmitt-
Rodermund (forthcoming) present evidence on interrelations between parenting style, personality traits, 
entrepreneurial orientation, and entrepreneurial career prospects among German subjects.  The results indirectly 
support the view that cultural values may induce path dependence in entrepreneurial activity (see also Woodruff 
1999).  This may have implications on transitional economies striving to encourage entrepreneurship (see Estrin, 
this volume). 
 
GENERAL SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
‘The two most important “core” institutions for encouraging entrepreneurship are well-defined property rights 
and the rule of law,’ aver Boettke and Coyne (2003: 77), echoing the current broad consensus that these social 
institutions are key for a thriving economy (Easterly and Levine 2002; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2002; 
Acemoglu and Johnson 2003).  Linking these institutions to entrepreneurship follows the same logic underlying 
institutional analyses of economic development: Widespread respect for well-defined legal entitlements and 
absence of arbitrary rent-seeking by power-holders (bribe-taking) reduce idiosyncratic risk and lower transaction 
costs.  Being the prime agents of economic change, entrepreneurs are especially sensitive to these factors (cf.  
Baumol 1990; Harper 1998).1 
We first consider entrepreneurship and informal institutions—specifically, the rule of law and 
corruption.  It should be noted that some studies of institutions and development fail to distinguish conceptually 
or in their empirical specification between security of property rights, the rule of law, and corruption.  Although 
such distinctions could be made, these informal institutions share conceptual elements as modes of wielding 
power, leading Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2003) to analyze them collectively as social norms of 
governance. 
Examining the emergence of new firms in five formerly-soviet countries, Johnson, McMillan and 
Woodruff (1999, 2000, 2002) find that insecure property rights—defined as frequent need to make extralegal 
payments (bribes), protection, or inefficient courts—were more inhibiting to entrepreneurship than inadequate 
finance (see also Ovaska and Sobel 2003).  Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2003), using a measure that intertwines 
both formal delineation and actual protection of property rights, find that in the emerging markets of Europe, 
greater fairness and greater property rights protection increase entry rates, reduce exit rates, and lower skewness 
in firm-size distributions.  Laeven and Woodruff (2004) find that in Mexico, states with more effective legal 
systems have larger firms, suggesting that a rule-of-law state enables entrepreneurial firms to grow by reducing 
idiosyncratic risk.  Cumming and colleagues use a measure of legality subsuming various indices of formal and 
informal legal protections and corruption to find that this measure predicts numerous beneficial features in 
venture capital transactions (Cumming, Schmidt and Walz 2004; Cumming and Fleming 2004).  Perotti and 
Volpin (2004) recently advanced a political economy model and evidence that suggest that lack of political 
(democratic) accountability and economic inequality are hindrances to entry. 
The literature is currently unsettled as to the antecedents of informal social institutions.  The colonial 
heritage of countries clearly has affected these institutions, with a heritage of British rule generally predicting 
better outcomes (Acemoglu and Johnson 2003; Treisman 2000).  Treisman (2000) also notes a correlation 
between Protestantism and lower corruption levels.  Studies have documented systematic correlations between 
corruption levels and Hofstede's cultural dimensions (Husted 1999; Hofstede 2001; Tonoyan 2004).  Drawing on 
Schwartz's (1999) cultural dimension theory, Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2003) find robust systematic 
correlations between national cultural profiles and perceived legality, corruption, and democratic accountability.  
Consistent with the preceding discussion, this evidence suggests that cultural orientations may impact 
entrepreneurship through their links with informal institutions. 
Turning now to formal legal rules and their relations to entrepreneurship, we first note that every piece 
of legislation that affects business also bears on entrepreneurs.  Beyond obvious issues like credit regulation and 
taxes, the list of relevant laws spans the gamut from regulation of entry (Djankov et al. 2002) to investor 
protection (La Porta et al. 1998) to procedural rules in commercial courts (Djankov et al. 2003).  This literature 
generally holds that greater protection of economic interests (‘property rights’ broadly defined) and nimble 
courts lead to beneficial outcomes.  Needless to say, the effectiveness of formal legal rules hinges on a 
widespread social norm of legality (Berkovitz, Pistor and Richard 2003), which, in turn, is strongly linked to 
national culture (Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz 2003). 
Here we note one issue that has stirred considerable interest among entrepreneurship scholars, namely, 
the factors that facilitated the remarkable success of the high-tech industry in Silicon Valley.  Saxenian 
(1994/1996) pointed out as such factor Silicon Valley's culture of openness, independence, democratic (‘flat’) 
corporate structure, and the Valley's ‘pioneer’ entrepreneurial spirit.  Saxenian further contrasted Silicon Valley's 
                                                          
1 Busenitz et al. (2000) define "country institutional profile" more capaciously than the conventional definitions in the 
economic literature, covering also what they call "cognitive dimension" and "normative dimension." 
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culture with Route 128's culture of secrecy, corporate hierarchy, and general Yankee conservatism.  The Valley's 
‘high-velocity labor market’ enabled skilled employees to switch firms frequently or start new firms as 
entrepreneurs (Hyde 1998).  Gilson (1999) responds that the different regional cultures are the consequence—not 
the antecedent—of the two regions' legal rules concerning the enforceability of covenants not to compete. While 
Massachusetts enforces such covenants within limits on employees, the California courts interpret its 
employment law as flatly banning these covenants—according to Gilson (2003), due to an historical accident 
that cannot be duplicated elsewhere. 
This case is noteworthy for several reasons. First, although Saxenian's analysis applied to the regional 
level one can identify in it the major features found in cross-cultural comparisons of countries that employ 
Hofstede's dimensions. Compared with Massachusetts, California is depicted as higher on individualism and 
lower on power distance and uncertainty avoidance – a ‘frontier culture’. But as Hofstede (2001) relentlessly 
notes, such comparisons are always relative. The alleged rigidity of Route 128's culture relative to Silicon 
Valley's likely pales in comparison to non English-speaking cultures (see Schwartz 2004). Second, in the long 
run, formal legal rules and the surrounding culture should be conceptually compatible with one another 
(Williamson 2000; Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz 2004). While the legal precedents interpreting California's 
law as banning covenants not to compete preceded the emergence of Silicon Valley, these precedents have been 
adopted and not overruled since because they were compatible with their contemporary ‘pioneer’ culture. Finally, 
the Silicon Valley case indicates the limits of the clearer-and-better-protected-property-rights thesis. What is 
highlighted as the key to the Valley's success—be it legal or cultural—is a norm, that essentially eroded existing 
firms' intellectual property. California thus managed to achieve an optimal blend of a high-quality institutional 
environment with the right doze of Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ of property rights. 
 
REPUTATIONAL BONDING AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
One of the main challenges for entrepreneurs around the world, but particularly for entrepreneurs in emerging 
and transition economies, is how to navigate around weak governance institutions at the country and regional 
level. Without strong governance institutions, especially without a strong legal system, outside investors go 
unprotected and are less likely to want to invest in a new entrepreneurial venture. The lack of strong governance 
institutions, therefore, stifles the broad sharing of technological and financial resources and capabilities across 
firm boundaries. Numerous studies, for example, have shown that firm-level development suffers from the lack 
of an effective rule of law (Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998; Levine 1999; Morck, Yeung, and Yu 2000; 
Wurgler 2000). Without sufficient rule of law, only some privileged networks of entrepreneurs will possess the 
enforcement mechanisms necessary to make joint investments, and the economy will see fewer large firms and 
more concentrated and entrenched ownership (He, Morck and Yeung 2003). Lower political accountability 
likewise hinders new entry (Perotti and Volpin 2004). Because both cultural and legal institutions are difficult to 
change (Milhaupt 1998; Roe 1996; Bebchuk and Roe 1999), firms in emerging economies select institutional 
strategies so that they can at least individually gain long-term access to outside resources and capabilities.  
In all environments, entrepreneurs must build reputation-enhancing relationships with outside resource 
providers who are willing to share valuable information, technology and finance. At the earliest stages of a 
firm’s existence, entrepreneurs require social contacts who can share the best leads on suppliers and customers. 
They also require financial investors willing to share scarce finance on an early-stage idea. Studies have shown 
that in emerging economies, credit constraints are one of the leading causes of small business failure (Fredland 
and Morris, 1976; Peterson and Shulman, 1987). Moreover, in most emerging economies, even just registering 
the firm and getting a business license is a long and cumbersome process (Djankov et al. 2002). Finding both 
talented and trustworthy employees is also difficult without help from reliable network contacts. 
The challenge for the entrepreneur is how to gain the confidence of these network contacts so that they 
will trust the entrepreneur with their valuable time, technology, and finance. This trust is not easy to create. 
Transactions built on social capital are typically not written down on paper and are rarely enforceable in court. 
Instead, as Portes (1998) comments, these transactions based on social capital ‘tend to be characterized by 
unspecified obligations, uncertain time horizons, and the possible violation of reciprocity expectations’ (4).  
In order to ameliorate the uncertainty and risk inherent in such transactions based on social capital, the 
entrepreneur can pursue what is termed a strategy of reputational bonding (Siegel 2004a). A reputational 
bonding strategy is an effort by the entrepreneurs to reduce their own incentive and maneuverability for later 
expropriating outside resource providers. The idea is to bond oneself by embedding oneself in a dense social 
network where the entrepreneur’s future access to suppliers and customers is determined by an ongoing record of 
trustworthy business dealings. Much as in Greif’s (1993) description of the Maghribi traders, entrepreneurs often 
seek out outside resource providers who share a common cultural bond. These cultural bonds are a major step 
towards building shared systems of fealty and honest business conduct.  
But beyond drawing on shared historical relations, entrepreneurs must often go one step further in 
creating ongoing social systems of mutual investment and nonlegal enforcement. As told in Siegel (2004b), 
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Korean entrepreneurs actively embed themselves in high school networks of elites. Just as for the Maghribi 
traders, Koreans share a collectivist culture based on shared identity and historical experience. While culture no 
doubt helps to facilitate resource sharing, culture is aided by ongoing firm-specific investments in network 
development and governance. These networks often take on the role of prosecutor, judge and jury in Korean 
society. Formal courts are costly and slow in operation. Members of the same network monitor each other and 
share information on each other’s behavior with other members. When one member is alleged to cheat on one 
another, ongoing norms of community enforcement help to spread news of the transgression and to build 
legitimacy for a joint punishment. Only those who have most strongly embedded themselves in the network 
structure, and who have gone on to obey the social norms of conduct within the network, enjoy the largest 
benefits in terms of receiving large-scale investment from network members.  
The concept of reputational bonding follows a long line of studies in the entrepreneurship literature on 
the ‘network success’ hypothesis. The seminal study in this tradition was that of Aldrich and Zimmer (1986), 
who noted that entrepreneurs are highly social actors who actively embed themselves in a social context. During 
the past decade, it has become an accepted theory in the global entrepreneurship literature that ‘those 
entrepreneurs who can refer to a broad and diverse social network and who receive much support from their 
network are more successful (network success hypothesis)’ (Brüderal and Preisendörfer 1998).  
In order to understand how social capital helps entrepreneurs to gain the trust of outside resource 
providers, it is worthwhile to examine the mechanisms by which social capital leads to trust. Portes and 
Sensenbrenner (1993) compellingly describe the four sources of social capital. The first source, value 
introjection, is based on identity from birth with a group, and leads the individual to behave in altruistic ways 
specifically towards members of that group. The second source, reciprocity exchanges, leads individuals to act 
generously to others in a defined group based on an established norm of reciprocity. The third source of social 
capital, bounded solidarity, comes from having experienced a common event or set of events during the course 
of life with a defined group of people. For example, Marx believed that the fact of having been oppressed 
together in the same factory would lead members of the working class to feel class consciousness and to act 
collectively. The final source of social capital, enforceable trust, comes from an expectation that a defined group 
would punish any individual who treats another member of the group inappropriately. Of these four sources of 
social capital, the global entrepreneurship literature has placed emphasis on reciprocity transactions and 
enforceable trust, the two sources that are motivated primarily by rational utility maximization. The other two 
sources, value introjection and bounded solidarity, have been seriously understudied within the entrepreneurship 
literature. It is time that further attention be given to their theoretical importance since even the rational game-
theoretical view of community enforcement often relies on an underlying cultural foundation based on common 
historical identity. 
Prior studies measure the importance of social capital through a well-accepted set of measures. The 
main approach of the literature looks at the personal network of the entrepreneurs and explores the effects of the 
network size and depth on business performance. The following variables are all thought to be positive indicators 
of social capital: network size, network density, network diversity, the preponderance of strong or weak ties, and 
network redundancy (Brüderal and Preisendörfer 1998).  
Strong ties are here defined based on the intensity of the relationship between two actors. Where 
intensity is high, the ties are labeled as being strong. This typically includes family members and close friends. 
Where intensity is low, but yet ongoing social contact is at least possible, the ties are characterized as weak. 
Granovetter (1974) found that network diversity through weak ties is most essential to gaining nonredundant 
information about the labor market. Burt (1982) further argued that entrepreneurs seeking information and 
market leverage should pursue bridging weak ties between otherwise disconnected economic actors.  
While weak ties may be most useful for accessing information and leveraging, strong ties are believed 
most essential for building the trust necessary for joint investment and collaboration. Coleman (1990) argued 
using a rational choice logic that strong ties are most helpful to those economic actors who require a social 
community that can enforce norms and good behavior. Coleman’s (1990) concept of closure is the most 
important in understanding the importance of strong ties for reputational bonding. Closure means the existence 
of a sufficient density of ties among a group of people to guarantee the faithful observance of norms. With a 
higher degree of mutual interaction, it becomes possible to have nonlegal/extralegal social enforcement of 
informal obligations. And with enforcement comes trust and increases in joint investment for entrepreneurial 
ventures. The rational choice explanation, however, is mostly not by itself sufficient to explain why dense ties 
lead to trust. Rational enforcement is potentially bolstered also through the process of value introjection and 
bounded solidarity cited above. With dense ties comes the potential for joint experiences within a densely 
connected group. The dense ties not only bring a greater probability of shared experience, but also allow for the 
cultural lessons and values drawn on those experiences to be more easily taught and positively reinforced within 
the shared community. 
The conclusion of this literature is not that investment in one type of social ties is uniformly better than 
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another, especially given the fact that these ties bring different types of resources to the entrepreneur. Strong ties 
can bring in resources that depend on nonlegal enforcement of obligations. These resources can include finance, 
technology and human capital. Weak ties, in contrast, can help the entrepreneur with accessing the diverse 
market information necessary to evaluate alternative managerial choices, to negotiate better terms with suppliers 
and customers, and to think of new solutions to business problems not already solved within the entrepreneur’s 
existing network.  
Prior studies measuring investments in both strong and weak ties had some serious flaws, and without 
empirical remedies, the literature is left without a clear idea of how these ties are created and what are their 
actual returns to the entrepreneurial venture. One set of studies focused on the opportunity structure by asking 
how many social contacts an entrepreneur might conceivably be able to approach for support (Aldrich and 
Zimmer 1986). This strategy did not go further to ask what investments entrepreneurs actually had made in 
trying to access this social structure. A second set of studies took the latter approach to trying to isolate the actual 
investment in social capital (Aldrich, Rosen, and Woodward, 1987; Aldrich, Reese, and Dubini, 1989), and it is 
not surprising that these latter studies produce the most convincing findings about positive returns to investment 
in social capital (Brüderal and Preisendörfer 1998).  
The other main challenge for this literature is about achieving more careful econometric identification 
of social capital as distinct from unobserved firm quality and other parts of the error term. In fact, without clear 
identification, many studies have failed to find any positive benefits from social capital. Aldrich, Rosen, and 
Woodward (1987) could not find significant positive effects of six social capital measures on business 
profitability. Also, without more careful econometric identification, numerous studies have found evidence 
suggesting that the decision to invest in social capital is really just an artifact of having weak resource 
endowments and a high probability of failure based on market performance (Bates 1994; Waldinger, Aldrich, 
and Ward, 1990; Light and Bhachu, 1993). Without finding instruments that isolate the decision to invest in 
social capital, these studies leave many open questions about whether social capital is actually of first-order 
importance when compared to unobserved human capital quality and other resource endowments inside the firm. 
It could be the case the ‘network success’ hypothesis should be replaced with the ‘network compensation’ 
hypothesis, by which weak firms compensate their weakness with social support (Brüderal and Preisendörfer 
1998). But we will not know a more definite answer to this debate unless future studies solve these challenges of 
identification.  
The empirical solution is to adopt greater use of instruments and exogenous shift variables to better 
identify the returns to investments in social capital and reputational bonding. Most models in the global 
entrepreneurship literature have focused on cross-sectional samples in which firm quality is proxied by recent 
sales growth. As Davidsson and Honig (2003) point out, such cross-sectional analysis cannot be used to 
determine at what stages of the entrepreneurial process the investment in social capital is important. As Hoang 
and Antoncic (2003) appropriately argue, entrepreneurial studies should be longitudinal and show how network 
content, governance and structure emerge over time. This is true, but even when work is focused on a certain 
stage of an entrepreneurial venture, any analysis that uses observables like sale growth as the only effort to 
control for unobserved quality will not lead to clear identification. The problem is that even with an observable 
variable like sales growth, there is still a high potential for the unobserved portion of firm quality in the error 
term to be correlated with the coefficient on network investments. 
There are solutions to this core methodological problem in the literature, and one example comes from a 
neighboring literature on overall social network effects. Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) wanted to 
test the theory in social science that poverty reinforces itself through social networks. The problem with 
demonstrating the economic importance of networks is that network effects may be highly correlated with 
unobserved individual, group and societal characteristics. In asking whether an individual was more likely to 
apply for social welfare if they lived next to other people on social welfare, Bertrand et al. devised a clever 
empirical design to deal with the unobserved factors. They focused on the fact that individuals who speak a non-
English language at home tend to interact mainly with other who speak that language. Bertrand et al. could insert 
fixed effects both for the neighborhood and for the language groups present in the neighborhood. With the fixed 
effects, they could soak up the unobserved factors. By then focusing on the interaction between language group 
and welfare use, they could show clear identification of strong network effects on welfare use.  
While this empirical strategy of finding an instrument (in this case non-English language groups 
interacted with welfare use) for network connections is highly useful, few studies in the global entrepreneurship 
literature have tried to come up with instruments. It is, nevertheless, possible to find instruments in various 
countries that can be used to cleanly identify the returns to entrepreneurial investment in social capital and 
reputation. One example is the study on investments in Korean social capital by Siegel (2004b). That study 
exploited two facts common to Korean society: (1) South Korean elites tend to favor members of the same high 
school network because high schools are the channel by which elites from politically hostile regions form 
personal alliances; and (2) South Korea has undergone a series of political shocks whose main effect has been to 
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remove one high school network from political power and to replace it with another. By focusing on the choice 
of an entrepreneur to hire a CEO or other senior executive from one rival network or another, and then by 
measuring the returns to these connections through their interaction with multiple political shocks, Siegel (2004b) 
was able to cleanly identify the importance of social networks for Korean entrepreneurs in gaining access to 
outside resources.  
The challenge for future empirical work in this literature is to look for instruments that determine 
investments in certain types of social capital, or else exogenous shocks that only affect entrepreneurs who have 
made certain investments. Without clear identification strategies, it is difficult to differentiate the ‘network 
success’ hypothesis from rival hypotheses focusing on the unobserved quality of individual entrepreneurs. The 
literature has made enormous strides in doing more careful longitudinal analysis, but more work on the process 
of entrepreneurship and the concurrent process of reputation building is needed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has given a broad overview of what are the social dimensions of entrepreneurship and how scholars 
have studied entrepreneurial attempt to build social advantage and reputation in the face of weak macro-level 
institutions for resource sharing. It is precisely in environments of weak resource-sharing institutions that 
reputation becomes both a scarce and economically more valuable asset. To build reputation, entrepreneurs must 
bond themselves by affiliating with a social network. Theory has predicted that entrepreneurs who invest the 
most in social capital will enjoy the highest overall financial returns. Yet empirical work testing this hypothesis 
has been inconclusive. Improved identification strategies are needed to better delineate the mechanism by which 
investments in social capital lead to sustainable competitive advantage. 
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